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Right Problem; Wrong Solution
Joseph L. Hoffmann†
Nancy J. King††
For the Great Writ of habeas corpus, these are the best of times and the
worst of times.
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court, in a powerful and eloquent
majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, vindicated the right of a nonU.S. citizen, held in custody at a military base outside the United States, to use
the writ to challenge the legality of his incarceration.1 Boumediene was a
triumph of both the individual petitioner and the judiciary over the powers of
the executive, and represents a high-water mark in the long and celebrated
history of habeas.
At the same time, in a different context, habeas is under siege. The version
of the writ that state prisoners use to collaterally attack their criminal
convictions—long a matter of controversy—is drawing fire once again. A
recent empirical study, headed by one of the co-authors of this essay, reveals
how habeas litigation in the criminal context has become almost completely
futile.2 Excluding the unique category of capital cases, the success rate for
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
† Professor Hoffmann is the Harry Pratter Professor of Law at Indiana University Maurer
School of Law.
†† Professor King is the Lee S. & Charles A. Speir Professor of Law at Vanderbilt
University Law School.
1. See generally 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (2007),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. This study is cited and
discussed in Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal
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challenging state criminal judgments in habeas is only one-third of 1 percent.3
Yet such litigation continues to consume scarce resources and engender
frustration among federal judges, members of Congress, state government
officials, crime victims, and academics.4
The new empirical evidence demonstrating the failure of criminal habeas
has helped spawn a new wave of scholarly proposals for habeas reform. One
such proposal is the subject of Professor Eve Brensike Primus’s article, A
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus.5
There is much to like in Professor Primus’s article. First and foremost, we
completely agree with her primary premise that habeas litigation in criminal
cases cannot be justified as a case-by-case remedy for individual violations of
federal constitutional rights.6 This is the crucial lesson of the recent empirical
findings, and it is a lesson that Professor Primus takes to heart. Too many
habeas scholars cling to the romantic vision of habeas as a curative for, or a
deterrent of, individual case-specific errors in the enforcement of federal rights
in state criminal cases.7 But the hard data, and the structural explanations that
lie behind them, obliterate the notion that habeas can possibly serve such a
romantic role. Professor Primus, to her credit, accepts this reality and moves
on.8
We also completely agree with Professor Primus that the solution to the
myriad problems of criminal habeas lies in the recognition that habeas has
always been about something else—namely, it has always been about
addressing structural issues, not individual case-by-case violations.9 Along
these lines, Professor Primus helpfully traces the particular version of habeas
used by state convicts today10 to the federalism crisis of Reconstruction.11
During the Reconstruction, Congress extended the writ to convicted state
prisoners as a way to ensure the obedience of defeated Confederate officials
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009) [hereinafter Hoffmann & King, Rethinking].
3. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 809.
4. See, e.g., Hearing on Habeas Reform: The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005: Hearing
on S. 1088 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2005), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/eisenberg_11_16_05_testimony1.pdf (testimony of Ronald
Eisenberg, Deputy District Att’y, Phila., Pa.) (“In the last decade, the number of [our] lawyers
employed exclusively on habeas work has increased 400% . . . .The truth is that, whether or not
they end up reversing a conviction, federal habeas courts drag out litigation for years of utterly
unjustifiable delay, creating exorbitant costs for the state . . . .”).
5. 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Primus].
6. See id. at 6.
7. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness
to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 360 (2006) (“Repeal or
suspension of the [habeas restrictions contained in the] AEDPA [statute] is now required to
improve the quality and reliability of criminal justice in the United States.”). The “romantic”
vision of habeas was perhaps best articulated by Justice William J. Brennan in his majority
opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
8. Primus, supra note 5, at 9–12.
9. Id. at 6–7.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
11. Primus, supra note 5, at 13–16.
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and sympathizers to federal laws that they still viewed as foreign and hostile.12
As Professor Primus also describes, the Supreme Court, under the
leadership of Justice William Brennan during the 1960s, came to rely upon
habeas to deal with a similar crisis of federalism.13 The Warren Court prompted
that crisis through its so-called criminal procedure revolution, which
recognized a plethora of new federal criminal procedure rights to coerce the
states into transforming their criminal justice systems.14 As Justice Brennan
explained at the time, the Court’s newly minted federal rights could not be
enforced properly in most states, due to a combination of two factors.15 First,
some state judges and officials opposed the new rights, viewing their
imposition by the federal government as illegitimate and insulting.16 Second,
most states had no post-conviction review process that would allow those new
federal rights to be asserted in state court.17
These two examples from habeas history—the expansion of the writ after
the Civil War and during the Civil Rights Era—reveal that habeas is about
more than case-by-case litigation over individual rights. We believe, however,
that a true understanding of habeas and its unique role in our society requires
pushing beyond the boundaries of criminal habeas altogether. Instead, habeas
must be examined in all of its varied contexts and applications.
In a forthcoming book, we have sought to do just that.18 Our analysis
concludes that habeas has always been about providing the federal judiciary
with a flexible, but extremely powerful, tool to use whenever a significant
societal change or crisis places the governmental balance of powers in serious
jeopardy.19
Sometimes the balance at stake is the one between the three branches of
the federal government. In times of crisis, the executive, often aided and
abetted by the legislature, may seek to imprison those who are perceived to

12. The most important of these new laws consisted of the 13th, 14th, and 15th
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and various federal statutes promulgated to help enforce
those constitutional provisions. See generally John E. Nowak, Federalism and the Civil War
Amendments, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1209 (1997) (describing history and purposes of the 13th,
14th, and 15th Amendments).
13. Primus, supra note 5, at 13–14.
14. See id.
15. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise
in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961).
16. See id. at 440 (“[T]he sensitivity of state judges towards federal habeas corpus has been
heightened as the Supreme Court has dealt increasingly with state administration of justice in
constitutional terms.”).
17. See id. at 441 (“I have the personal conviction that if such [state post-conviction]
procedures were the rule and not the exception, redress by state judiciaries of violations of the
Federal Constitution would ordinarily result, and intervention by any federal court including the
United States Supreme Court would become unnecessary.”).
18. See NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS CORPUS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (forthcoming 2010) (expanding in the first chapter upon the argument presented
here), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1517840.
19. See id. at 10.
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pose a threat.
Sometimes, as occurred after the Civil War and during the civil rights era,
the balance at stake is the one between the federal and state governments.20
During such a crisis of federalism, the hostile states may disregard federally
guaranteed rights or even seek to imprison those who represent federal
interests.
In both kinds of national crises, the federal judiciary—and especially the
Supreme Court—must possess the ability to respond flexibly to the particular
crisis at hand. Habeas is an inherently flexible remedy. It allows the courts to
deal with any kind of governmental overreaching that seriously threatens
individual liberty, even when the particular form of overreaching could not
have been anticipated. The judiciary can readily adapt the writ to address any
kind of new situation involving fundamentally unjust incarceration. This is the
great power that led the Framers to view habeas with such respect, even
reverence.21
But with great power comes great responsibility. Habeas is a potent
remedy that the judiciary must use prudently, lest the courts inadvertently drain
the deep reservoir of respect that has sustained it for centuries. Sweeping
habeas decisions, like Boumediene22 and Gideon v. Wainwright,23 that assert
the power of the federal judiciary to block other institutions of government
from imprisoning persons in defiance or disregard of the Constitution, are built
on that foundation of respect.
The twin attributes of flexibility and prudence have long shaped the story
of habeas. Viewed across the entire sweep of American history, and in varied
contexts including but not limited to the review of criminal cases, habeas
repeatedly has been pressed into service as an emergency stop-gap measure,
allowing the courts to intervene and order the release of prisoners who would
otherwise be left without an adequate remedy.24 However, as the issuance of
the writ becomes common, lawmakers’ attention turns to tailoring a remedy for
the specific threat to liberty at hand, developing alternative avenues for judicial
review. Eventually, these alternative procedures supplant habeas litigation.
When habeas works well, in other words, it gradually brings about its own
obsolescence. This story has been repeated time and time again, in
controversies involving immigration, terrorism, war, and federal crimes.25
The problem with habeas review of state criminal cases is that, even
though the particular crisis of federalism that gave rise to its twentieth-century
expansion has long since passed, the federal courts continue to entertain, on a
routine basis, vast numbers of habeas petitions filed by convicted state
20.
21.
22
23.
24.
25.

See id.
See id. at 11.
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 18, at 12–13.
All of these examples, and more, are discussed in our new book. See id.
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prisoners.26 This remains true even though such prisoners today generally enjoy
the full opportunity to seek judicial review in state court for asserted violations
of their federal constitutional rights.27
Professor Primus points out that these state courts do not always side with
the prisoner, and she clearly sees the glass of state judicial review as half
empty.28 We beg to differ. Compared with the structural barriers to state
judicial review that state prisoners faced in the 1960s, which Justice Brennan
described, the glass today is much more than half full. All states now provide
convicted prisoners with not only an opportunity for direct appeal of their
federal claims, but also some form of modern post-conviction review to deal
with non-record federal claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or
prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence.29 And today, state judges as
a rule no longer resist federal law simply because it is federal. Disagreements
over the scope and content of federal constitutional rights persist in state courts
as well as lower federal courts, but state judges are no longer fighting the
enforcement of criminal procedure rules simply because they arise from the
federal constitution rather than from state law.30
This wholesale acceptance of the supremacy of federal criminal procedure
law makes all the difference, once habeas is properly viewed as a flexible
remedy for serious disruptions in the balance of government powers. Professor
Primus argues forcefully that we “underestimate[] the degree to which state
courts still routinely violate defendants’ constitutional rights,”31 and she
provides many examples. But even if her argument holds water, she does not
claim that the state courts are failing to vindicate those federal rights because
they are federal. If this were still true, then we might still be facing the kind of
structural crisis involving government powers that habeas is designed to
address. We are convinced, however, that this is no longer true.
We acknowledge that reasonable persons might disagree over the “halffull, half-empty” characterization of state judicial review of federal
constitutional claims in criminal cases. But the Supreme Court and Congress
clearly no longer perceive the need for more aggressive federal habeas
oversight of the state courts in non-capital cases.32 Yet the habeas dance goes
26. In 2006, habeas corpus petitions filed by non-capital state prisoners made up one of
every fourteen civil cases filed in the United States district courts. JAMES C. DUFF, 2006 JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 162 (2007)
(Table C-2), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/front/
completejudicialbusiness.pdf.
27. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 795, 835–36.
28. See Primus, supra note 5, at 16–23 (explaining the reasons behind her view that a
“coercive” model of federal judicial review is still necessary).
29. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 841–42 nn. 187–188.
30. Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT.
REV. 65, 77–80 (1994).
31. See Primus, supra note 5, at 17.
32. See Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 805–06 (noting congressional
restrictions on habeas review under the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act); id.
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on, with convicted state prisoners filing tens of thousands of habeas petitions
each year that must be defended by states’ attorneys and reviewed by federal
courts.33
In the end, we think Professor Primus does not go far enough with her
structural analysis. When Professor Primus refers to the “structural vision” of
habeas,34 she is talking about using habeas to try to force a change in the
structure of state criminal justice. When we talk about a “structural approach”
to habeas, by contrast, we are talking about using habeas to force a change in
the relationship between institutions of government—either a change in the
federal balance of powers, or a change in the balance of federalism. During the
1960s, habeas did help to bring about such a change in the balance of
federalism, by forcing reluctant states to accept the supremacy of federal
criminal procedure law and to provide a state judicial review process
appropriately designed to vindicate that law.35 Problems in state criminal
justice may persist, but they are no longer caused by state resistance to federal
authority. The problems of today—whether they involve the failings of police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, jurors, judges, or legislators—are not the kinds
of problems that habeas is designed to, or can, solve.
This leads to our final observation about Professor Primus’s article. After
providing a comprehensive review and critique of habeas reform proposals
advanced over the past several decades, Professor Primus proposes a truly
novel approach. Her approach would convert habeas from a case-by-case
remedy into a remedy for constitutional violations that occur in many different
cases—to address what she defines as a “systemic” problem.36 In other words,
she proposes to turn habeas into something that would resemble the
substance—although certainly not the form—of class-action litigation. She
would provide federal attorneys to help individual habeas petitioners develop
the facts in support of their claims of “systemic” violations.37 And she would
authorize the federal courts to order the release of individual petitioners, and—
via separate habeas petitions handled on a “fast-track” basis—all other
petitioners similarly situated.38 This release authority would be available unless
and until the particular state fixed the particular “systemic” problem identified
by the federal courts.39
We have already explained why we think the problems of state criminal
justice today are not the kinds of problems that post-conviction litigation in
at 812 n.74 (listing limitations on habeas review imposed by the Court since 1973).
33. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
43 (2004) (Table C-2), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C02Mar04.pdf
(reporting that 18,552 petitions were filed in federal district courts in 2004).
34. See Primus, supra note 5, at 1 (article title).
35. See Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 835.
36. See Primus, supra note 5, at 5 (defining “systemic” violation).
37. See id. at 35–39.
38. See id. at 31–33.
39. See id. at 32–33.
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habeas can solve. Professor Primus’s proposal purports to overcome these
shortcomings by (1) requiring Congress to pay lawyers to represent (all?)
indigent prisoners who allege violations that they claim are “systemic”; (2)
eliminating the exhaustion requirement (even for appeals?) so that thousands of
additional prisoners would be able to file their claims directly in federal court;
and (3) adding a new prerequisite for relief requiring that a petitioner not only
clear existing procedural hurdles, but also establish that some unspecified
proportion of other prisoners (should have?) succeeded based on the “same”
claim.40 Implementing this complicated new scheme and resolving the many
questions left unanswered in the proposal would increase, rather than decrease,
the volume, complexity, and cost of habeas litigation in the federal courts. At
root, the proposal is yet another version of the same strategy we argue is both
obsolete and unwise.41 The proposal would continue to sink even more tax
dollars into post-conviction litigation of claims of error that competent defense
counsel likely could have prevented or cured earlier at much lower cost.
Moreover, under Professor Primus’s proposal, many of these claims, even if
valid, will continue to be waived in pleas, forfeited by mistakes, and ignored
after conviction as harmless.
Professor Primus’s particular version of post-conviction litigation, we
fear, would prove especially unworkable. The proposal would effectively place
the federal courts in the position of not only catalyzing, but also supervising on
an ongoing basis, the reform of innumerable aspects of state criminal justice.
We are deeply skeptical that federal courts are appropriate for this supervisory
role, since they lack the ability to conduct studies, hold legislative-type
hearings, balance competing governmental needs and interests, or deal with
complex political pressures.
More importantly, the proposal stands little chance of adoption. Professor
Primus acknowledges the need for a quid pro quo kind of trade-off that would
provide Congress and the states an incentive to buy into any new idea that
could lead to serious state criminal justice reform.42 But her proposal offers
precious little “quid” in exchange for a very large “quo.” Habeas litigation
would become more costly and complicated under her proposal, for both the
federal government and the states. And the states will understandably resist any
proposal that may force them to relinquish control over their criminal justice
systems to the ongoing close supervision of the federal judiciary. The lack of a
more balanced quid pro quo dooms Professor Primus’s proposal to the
netherworld of academic commentary.

40. See id. at 26–40.
41. This is the strategy of post hoc litigation in the federal courts, as opposed to our
suggested strategy that focuses on a comprehensive federal approach to stimulating and
supporting reforms at the state level. See generally Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2
(presenting and explaining our suggested strategy).
42. See Primus, supra note 6, at 41 (stressing need for “compromise between rival political
camps”).
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We have previously proposed what we think is a more plausible quid pro
quo. Our proposal, outlined in an article we published in the New York
University Law Review, is less ambitious, focusing on the reform of just one
key aspect of state criminal justice: the adequacy of defense representation.43
We consider this to be the most important aspect because competent defense
attorneys can help to protect all other rights, for innocent as well as guilty
defendants. Our proposal relies on state-driven best practices, contemplates
voluntary, not forced, reforms, and includes the “carrot” of federal grant
funding for states, to whatever extent Congress might be persuaded to authorize
such funding.44 Perhaps this is also politically unlikely, especially in the current
economy. But without such a supply of additional resources for the states, no
proposal to reform state criminal justice is likely to make much of a difference.
We believe our reform proposal, limited as it is, has a much better chance of
being adopted and eventually achieving some kind of success than Professor
Primus’s proposal, which would exacerbate even further the cost of postconviction litigation and put the federal courts in charge of a potentially
unlimited reform agenda.

43.
44.

Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 823–25.
Id. at 823–33.

